At 10:36 on a Monday, ransomware encrypted the main database server of a UAE trading company with 26 branches. Invoicing stopped at every branch. The newest clean backup was four and a half trading days old, and the server had been reformatted before recovery began. We rebuilt the ERP to the minute of the attack.

The company’s ERP runs on SQL Server on its main database server, a Windows Server 2022 machine. At 10:36 on a Monday, Mimic ransomware encrypted it. Every branch stopped invoicing at once.
The newest clean backup had been taken at midnight going into Thursday, so four and a half trading days of records existed nowhere else. By the time we were called, the server had been reformatted and Windows reinstalled — the usual first move to get trading again, and normally the end of any hope for the missing days.
The way in was ordinary. Remote Desktop was open to the internet with Network Level Authentication switched off and no account lockout; 35,738 failed Administrator logons were on record. The built-in Administrator password had not changed since the server was built in 2023.
The attackers first logged in at 05:04 on the Sunday. At 05:08 they created their own administrator account, and within about four minutes the antivirus and the backup agent had been uninstalled. Overnight there were brief logins from a second country — the pattern of access being checked and passed on. At 10:23 on Monday an operator logged in from a third country, ran password-dumping tools and a network scan, and started the encryption at 10:36. The logs were cleared at 12:28. They had been inside for 29 hours before anything was encrypted.
Evidence first, the same day: a live collection, including a 138 GB memory image. From the surviving logs, the registry and memory we built the timeline above, minute by minute.
The business went back onto the clean backup so the branches could trade the next morning. In parallel, we scanned the reinstalled server’s entire 1.92 TB disk read-only, while it kept working. Reinstalling Windows replaces the file system, not every sector beneath it. The scan found 7.17 million database pages newer than the backup, each one verified by SQL Server’s own page checksum.
We merged 6.36 million of those pages over the clean backup — 99.98% of them checksum-valid — and applied 262,775 new rows and 694,764 updated ones. The rebuilt database passes DBCC CHECKDB with no errors and no constraint violations.
The branches were trading again the next morning on the clean backup. Within 48 hours of the attack the ERP was rebuilt to 10:36, the minute the encryption started.
Of the 7,683 invoices raised in the missing days, 7,635 were recovered — 99.4%. At least 85% of every other numbered record from those days came back, measured exactly by serial number. The attackers’ attempts to move to office PCs all failed, and none of the other PCs we examined had been encrypted.
The client received an investigation report, a forensic technical report, a data recovery report and a rebuild checklist: no inbound port forwards, VPN with two-factor authentication, account lockout, tamper-protected endpoint protection, offline or immutable backups with monthly restore tests, central logging and network segmentation.
Wiped describes the file system,
not the data.
Encrypted, or already reinstalled?
Call before anything more is written to the disk.